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CHAPTER 5
A METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
USE OF COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW
Monroe E. Price and Stefaan G. Verhulst
During the debate over the Indian Broadcasting Bill, one of
the most interesting and potentially useful documents was the
"Survey of National Broadcasting, Cable, and DTH Satellite
Laws" ("Survey" or "Paul Weiss Survey") submitted to the Joint
Parliamentary Committee entrusted with the task of fine-tuning
the Bill.^ This Survey was submitted on behalf of the Working
Group on the Broadcasting Industry, a subcommittee of the Amer
ican Business Council ("Working Group" or "Group"). The Sur
vey examines and compares the relevant regulatory regimes of
several selected nations^ and is, therefore, helpful in understanding
the possible benefits and limitations of comparative media law as
an aid to legislation and law reform.
There is an increasing demand today for such comparative re
search, partly due to the growing internationalization and the con
comitant export and import of social, cultural, and economic
manifestations across national borders. Yet, few have examined
the potential methodological issues that exist in the preparation of
such work.^ The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the possibili
ties, limitations, and pitfalls of comparison, and to probe problems
1 The Broadcasting Bill was immediately referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee
after its introduction in the Lok Sabha in May 1997. The Committee, headed by Sharad
Pawar, comprises 20 Lok Sabha members and 10 from the Rajya Sabha (the two Parlia
mentary Houses). At its first meeting on June 16, the Committee singled out the "conten
tious" issues of cross-media holdings and foreign equity together with an action plan to
examine these issues in more detail. The plan included inviting media companies to make
representations on the two issues as well as other provisions of the proposed Bill. It was
also stated that the intention of the Committee was to study the models in large democra
cies such as the US and the United Kingdom ("UK"). Despite the traditional practices of
Parliament, the documents and evidence submitted to the Committee were not made
public.
2 The report examines the relevant laws, regulations and orders of the European
Union ("EU"), France, Germany, Italy, UK, Canada, US, Australia, Hong Kong, Indone
sia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan, the Republic of China.
3 Cf. COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL SO
CIAL RESEARCH (Else Oyen ed., 1990).
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of definition, methodology and presentation. These issues are
present in any comparative media structure study, and the Paul
Weiss Survey is used as a way of exploring these questions.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE PAUL WEISS SURVEY

After the announcement by the Minister of Information and
Broadcasting, S. Jaipal Reddy, that a bill had been prepared and
was to be submitted to Parliament, a number of the affected broad
casting entities (especially those who were broadcasting via a satel
lite uplink from Hong Kong and Singapore)'* formed a loose
association to consider arguments against the most severe and po
tentially discriminatory aspects of the proposed legislation. The
group soon discovered that key issues in the Bill, such as
mandatory uplinking within India, a cap on foreign equity partici
pation, and stringent cross-media ownership rules, were being justi
fied by reference to media laws and reforms elsewhere, especially
laws of Western Europe. The Ministry of Information and Broad
casting emphasized the relevance of European and other broad
casting models in its Issues and Perspectives note, which clarifies
the underlying rationales of the Bill: "[F]or formulating a basic
framework of the broadcasting law . . . we should follow a model
which is already tried and tested elsewhere in the world. . . . For
this purpose, broadcasting systems in six countries i.e. USA, UK,
France, Germany, Italy and Australia have been studied."^ The
note establishes, as well, that the UK provides the most relevant
model for the basic framework of the proposed Broadcasting Bill.
In addition, the note maintains its use of comparisons from other
jurisdictions to justify various sections of the Bill.
The Working Group, having read the draft Bill and the state
ments concerning its history and basis, considered that the pur
ported justifications of the Bill, deeply embedded in the material
referred to by the Ministry, were based on misleading information,
or at least upon a misconception of the practices of the relevant
countries. As a result, the Group engaged the law firm Paul, Weiss,
The group of broadcasters includes ESPN India, GE International Operations
(CNBC), MTV, MOM Gold, Encore International Inc., Motion Picture Association of
America, Innerasia Consulting Group, Space Systems/Loral, News Television India (STAR
TV), Turner International, Sony Entertainment, Discovery Channel, United International
Holding, and Panamsat.
5 MINISTRY OF INFO, AND BROAD., BROADCASTING BILL: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 2

(1996) [hereinafter ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES].
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Wharton, Rifkind and Garrison ("Paul Weiss") to conduct a survey
of national broadcasting, local delivery systems, and satellite laws.
The assumption of the Working Group was that a neutral and in
formed report, based on such a survey, would help the Parliamen
tary Committee see the need for an alternative approach from the
one contained in the Bill. Phillip L. Spector,® a partner of Paul
Weiss in Washington, D.C., who has a longstanding expertise in sat
ellite regulation and in regulation of broadcasting in various parts
of the world, was placed in charge of the Survey. The terms of
reference stated that the information gathered in the Survey would
be factual, tailored to the needs of the Joint Parliamentary Com
mittee, and comprehensive, summarizing the practices of countries
which were cited or seemed otherwise relevant. Most importantly,
the Survey would present this information in a readily understand
able way. In this respect, the Survey would not have explicit con
clusions or recommendations.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY

The first important question in developing the Survey was the
choice of issue areas and countries as the basis of comparison; they
are the ones "considered to be ... critical... in terms of compari
sons to models elsewhere."^ The issues selected were as follows:
1. foreign ownership restrictions directed at cable service
providers and satellite-delivered television program channels,
as well as DTH satellite service providers;
2. cross-media ownership restrictions among DTH and cable
service providers and satellite-delivered channels;
3. requirements of auctions for DTH and cable service pro
vider licenses and other restrictive rules concerning the licens
ing of broadcasting services;
4. requirements for uplinking of satellite broadcasting services
within a country; and
5. requirements or strong preferences for the use of orbital
slots licensed by the country to providers of DTH or other
satellite channel delivery services.
6 Together with Patrick S. Campbell, Marcia Ellis and Douglas Melcher, all at Paul
Weiss. Stefaan Verhulst, one of the co-authors of this chapter, was engaged as a consultant
on European law. The Survey was delivered to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on July
17, 1997.
7 See PAUL, WEISS, WHARTON, RIFKIND & GARRISON, SURVEY OF NATIONAL BROAD
CASTING, CABLE, AND DTH SATELLITE LAWS at ii (1997) [hereinafter PAUL, WEISS].
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The issues reflect, in part, the primary concerns of the Work
ing Group. These are most, but far from all, of the issues that dom
inated both the media and political agenda of broadcasting reform.
Noteworthy are those issues where comparative models might have
been relevant but were excluded either for reasons of time, un
availability of information, or other reasons. For example, the pro
posed Indian Broadcasting Bill has very restrictive foreign equity
limitations for the licensing of terrestrial broadcasters. A compara
tive study might have demonstrated that the proposed Indian ap
proach is more exclusionary than the international norm.
Similarly, the Paul Weiss Survey did not include a discussion of
restrictions on program content. Here too, much could be learned
from the practices and regulations of other countries.
It is also possible, perhaps likely, that these excluded issues
such as foreign ownership of terrestrial broadcasting licenses and
program content limitations, were not so high on the agenda of the
Working Group. Here, the structure of the Survey was itself a re
flection of emerging trends in transnational broadcasting where
ownership regulation is more contested than programming regu ation. The shaping of the Survey implies a higher tolerance for
country-by-country program standards than for what might e
deemed anti-competitive uses of foreign equity requirements to
limit entry into the new technological modes of broadcasting deliv
ery. Similarly, this shaping of the Survey suggests a division be
tween the old technology and the new with a
acceptance of foreign equity limits in traditional forms of delivery
of imagery, such as terrestrial television (the scarcity rationale),
than in the new and developing forms, such as cable and satellite.
Strictly speaking, the Survey is a form of comparative analysis
in which it is the task of the reader to draw interpretive conclusions
from the formatted material. The Survey seeks to describe a par
ticular set of issues, country by country, not to draw conclusions as
to what conditions lead to what combination of approaches or what
combination of approaches is dominant. Nor does the Survey char
acterize a particular form of government as, say, authontarian or
democratic. In the section on Europe, there are some internal dis
tinctions noted, as, for example, where French practice is com
trasted with Italian practice. Here, too,
regulation is described within the constraints of the EU (or the
Council of Europe). One function of the Survey is to show that,
despite harmonization of European legal systems, there are deep-

1997]

PAUL WEISS SURVEY

All

seated differences in ideology, political attitudes, and social and
economic policies. Even in Europe, fundamental moral values and
philosophies, attitudes to law, and judicial, executive and adminis
trative procedures still have not been wholly reconciled, and these
differences are reflected in national media policies.®
The Paul Weiss Survey is composed of brief country-by-country discussions, reduced to a set of summary tables. There are ta
bles for the Indian Broadcasting Bill, EU member states. North
America, and for Asian/Pacific countries. The table for India
serves as a reference point. The EU and its members seem to be
those countries, characterized by the Indian Government as "lead
ing democratic countries,"^ that are deemed the most influential
models for Indian decision makers. The North American table is
included because of the relevance of Canadian practices — particu
larly its historic cultural wariness towards the US — and the juris
prudential role that American precedents play, especially given the
American origin of most companies in the Working Group. The
Asia/Pacific Table is included for many reasons, but partly because
the Indian Government has seemed, from time to time, to describe
itself as different from, more democratic than, and with a tendency
to be more open than, countries like Malaysia and Singapore.
Geography is one convenient, but by no means the only,
method of organizing information for purposes of comparison.
The same broadcasting rules could be presented in a tabular way
where the organizational principle was related to annual per capita
income, length of history of independence, relative level of restric
tions, or history and experience with private commercial television.
Another possible approach to organizing information concerning
regulation — one far more difficult and perhaps impossible —
would be to deal with context, not with rules. Societies would be
organized by the variety and number of images (through televi
sion) that could be received by individuals, which might or might
not be a reflection of the formal rules within broadcasting
regulation.
Geography does not necessarily distinguish between cultureimporting and culture-exporting countries. Canada and the US,
both parts of the North American table, are fundamentally similar
® See, e.g., DAVID GOLDBERG & STEFAAN VERHULST, EUROPEAN MEDIA POLICY:
COMPLEXITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS (1996).
^ ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 1.

428

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 5:423

and archetypically different. Australia and Taiwan, both parts of
the Asian/Pacific table, share geography, but come from extremely
different traditions. These countries are part of a common physical
field of distribution of signals and share similar broadcast strate
gies, and for that reason may be compared, although in other ways
they have histories that complicate this form of organization.
III.

THE OUTCOMES OF THE SURVEY

As indicated above, the Paul Weiss Survey is a form of com
parative media law research which characterizes and summarizes
but refrains from drawing conclusions. The task of the Survey was
to present to decision makers in India a summary of practices in
response to contentious issues and questions which are critical to
the architecture of the proposed Bill.
However, conclusions are readily inferred from the Survey, as
they were meant to be. The Survey is studiously factual and care
fully objective but is also an advocacy document prepared at the
behest of third parties seeking to yield changes in the Broadcasting
Bill. It is an advocacy document of a particular kind; it is premised
on the notion that accurate information will be a more effective
form of argument than impassioned rhetoric. Of course, there are
difficult questions imbedded in this form of objectivity: how to se
lect information, which information to exclude or include, or in this
case, which countries to exclude or include, even whether asking
the question on a country-by-country basis is appropriate. The ap
proach is especially applicable here where the methodology of
comparative media law and policy is used both to justify and to
influence law reform and legislation.
The outcomes are striking. The Indian table, a description of
the proposed Broadcasting Bill, is the referent. It depicts the fam
ily of restrictions that exists in the Bill. Mandatory national uplinking is conjoined with channel leasing, restrictions on foreign
ownership, restrictive, auction-based licensing of cable and DTK,
and strong preferences for the leasing of satellites using national
orbits. The tables indicate that none of the comparison countries
have the package of combined restrictions and limitations as are
present in the Broadcasting Bill. Elements of the Bill, though, may
be present in some countries, and concerns that prompted the pro
visions of the Indian Bill may exist elsewhere as well. However, a
canvass of the Survey demonstrates that it is highly unusual to re
quire — as India does — mandatory upUnking from within the
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boundaries of a state. Moreover, few of the comparison countries
license satellite television broadcasting services, and none license
such services uplinked from outside national boundaries. Limita
tions on foreign equity ownership in satellite television broadcast
ing services are therefore mostly limited to domestic services.
None of the countries in the comparison group auction DTH and
cable licenses (as opposed to spectrum allocations). Finally, the
Survey shows that no country in the comparison group has as rigid
a cross-media ownership restriction or limitation on the number of
licenses as India. These conclusions are more valid for European
and North American countries but, even looking beyond these pre
ferred models, very few countries have the same combination of
competition-depressing factors, mandatory uplinking, satellite tele
vision broadcast service licensing, cross-media restrictions, and
content restrictions as are present in the Broadcasting Bill.
IV. CAVEATS
Comparative media law studies of the kind reflected in the
Paul Weiss Survey are still at the pioneering stage^° and are both
difficult and risky. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the limita
tions and potential pitfalls of such studies.
Comparisons can lead to fresh, exciting insights and a deeper
understanding of issues that are of central concern in different
countries. They can lead to the identification of gaps in knowledge
and may point to possible directions that could be followed, direc
tions that previously may have been unknown to observers or, in
this case, legal reformers. Comparisons may also help to sharpen
the focus of analysis of the subject under study by suggesting new
perspectives.
Comparative research also poses certain well-known problems
(e.g., accessing comparable data and comparing concepts and re
search parameters).^^ These are general problems which confront
all cross-national research. Additionally, when comparing differ
ent jurisdictions and legal systems further pitfalls can be noticed:
(1) linguistic and terminological perspectives; (2) cultural differ10 For earlier notable contributions comparing media laws, see ERIC BARENDT,
BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1993) and WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM,
REGULATING MEDIA: THE LICENSING AND SUPERVISION OF BROADCASTING IN SIX COUN
TRIES (1996).
11 See LINDA HANTRAIS & STEEN MANGEN, CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH METHODS
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1996).
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ences between legal systems; (3) the potential of arbitrariness in
the selection of objects of study; (4) difficulties in achieving "com
parability" in comparison; (5) the desire to see a common legal pat
tern in legal systems (the theory of a general pattern of
development); (6) the tendency to impose one's own (native) legal
conceptions and expectations on the systems being compared; and
(7) dangers of exclusion/ignorance of extralegal rules.^^
The authors of the Paul Weiss Survey forthrightly provide
three possible sources of limitations in their own introduction: first,
whether the statutory and secondary material available to those en
gaged in comparative research is adequate for describing the laws
of particular countries; second, whether the rapid and constant
change of broadcasting and telecommunications law makes it such
that information, even if correct when stated, is soon out of date;
and finally, even if information is available and correct, whether it
is possible to summarize, compress, or reduce it adequately to ele
ments that are comparable. These are questions of organization,
terminology, and presentation. Each of these survey-related cave
ats is worth discussing in detail, while also accounting for the more
general methodological problems of comparative research.
A.

Limitations on Availability of Statutory and Other Regulatory
Material

Despite the researchers' expertise and experience in the field,
the absence of ready, comprehensive, and up-to-date material re
mains a definite limitation on the capacity to undertake meaningful
comparative media law and policy research. This shortcoming lim
its the way researchers, advocates, and legislators can use compara
tive research in their process of reform.
This limitation has also been recognized by some regional au
thorities which are highly dependent on comparative material in
order to monitor the implementation of existing multilateral agree
ments, for instance, or to highlight the need for action in certain
areas. This is especially true since an important function of com
parative law research is its significant role in the preparation of
projects for the international unification of law.^^ As the best ex12 See 1 KONRAD ZWEIOERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (Tony Weir trans., 1989).

13 The political aim behind such unification is to reduce or eliminate, so far as desirable
and possible, the discrepancies between the national legal systems by inducing them to
adopt common principles of law. The method used in the past and still often practiced
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ample of this problem, the Council of Europe in 1992 established
the Emopean Audiovisual Observatory" to assist in assuring that
each member state's broadcasting laws are available and as trans
parent as possible. More recently, the European Commission de
veloped an even more sophisticated system. The "Communication
Concerning Regulatory Transparency in the Internal Market for
Information Society Services"" states that the regulatory activity
for which the ground is being prepared in the member states might,
if it is not monitored, jeopardize the objective of attaining an inter
nal market." Re-fragmentation and overregulation are cited as
possible consequences of the lack of transparency and comparative
data. The Commission proposed four features to obtain greater
transparency:
1. a binding legal instrument;
2. a prior information procedure (member states will be
obliged to notify the Commission of any draft rule or regula
tion which will be applicable to Information Society services at
a stage in its preparation in which substantial amendments can
still be made);
3. a consultation procedure (after notice, a standstill period of
three months starts to run during which member states and the
Commission may intervene to make comments and opinions);
and
4. a committee (to administer the procedure).
today is to draw up a uniform law on the basis of work by experts in comparative law and
to incorporate it in a multipartite treaty which obliges the signatories, as a matter of inter
national law, to adopt and apply the uniform law as their municipal law.
14 Established in December 1992, the European Audiovisual Observatory is a public
service organization dedicated to gathering and distributing information on the European
audiovisual sector. Currently, 33 European states as well as the European Commission are
members of the Observatory. Created under the auspices of Audiovisual Eureka, the Ob
servatory functions within the legal framework of the Council of Europe and carries out its
mission with a network of partners, correspondents, and professional organizations. The
Observatory publishes economic, legal, and practical information regarding broadcasting
and new media and runs a legal information service desk.
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and
the Economic and Social Committee Concerning Regulatory Transparency in the Internal
Market for Information Society Services: Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive Amending for the Third Time Directive 83/189/EEC Laying Down a Procedure
for the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations,
COM(96)392 final.
16 Id. at 23.
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At a more international level, the OECD publishes yearly its
Communications Outlook which includes an overview of the rele
vant regulatory regimes and policies on telecommunications and
broadcasting in specific countries.^"' The case studies largely de
pend upon the accuracy and expertise of the civil servants who
were contacted by the OECD and are, therefore, not always up-todate or reliable. Moreover, some of the contacted states were re
luctant or too late in sending the needed material, making it diffi
cult to draw general conclusions.
But even where there is an organized and institutionalized ef
fort, it is difficult to capture and transmit the nuances of each
state's communications and broadcasting regulation and policy.
Each law is the result of different initiatives, actions, and logics
from various institutions and actors. To understand, for example,
broadcasting regulation in the UK (e.g., on issues of ownership),
one must have access not only to acts of Parliament, but to policy
documents of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (the
former Department of National Heritage), the Department of
Trade and Industry, decisions of regulatory agencies such as the
Independent Television Commission ("ITC" or "Commission")
and the Office of Fair Trading, as well as judgments of the courts.
In addition, UK broadcasting (and ownership) policy is — as with
other countries — highly influenced by regional obligations (e.g.,
articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome) and may be a function of
other bilateral or multilateral agreements, including those leading
to the formation of the World Trade Organization. Furthermore,
court decisions are more important in a common law system than,
say, France or Germany, where the civil law culture dominates.
Comparisons — especially abstracted and telegraphed com
parisons — encourage a search for certainty (or a kind of state
ment of certainty) where certainty may not exist. The complicated
nature of determining which documents from which agencies are
relevant in ascertaining the nature of a state's position on a particu
lar question is a marker of potential uncertainty. In France, for
instance, the Act of September 30, 1986 still forms the regulatory
basis and framework for broadcasting.^® However, in order to
adapt the legal framework to comply with legal, technical, and
market developments, the Act has been modified and amended by
OECD, COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK 1997 (1997).
18 Act No. 86-1067 of Sept. 30,1986 on the Freedom of Communication.

1997]

PAUL WEISS SURVEY

433

countless laws making it a complex and risky operation, even for
an experienced French lawyer, to determine which section has
been amended by which law and which new article applies to which
situation. A similar situation of complexity and uncertainty existed
in Australia until a new regulatory framework was introduced on
July 1,1997, which in itself brings new uncertainties and potential
legal challenges.
The same imbalance characteristic of other aspects of interna
tional trade and knowledge is also presented in this area of media
law and policy. Libraries that may have electronic databases filled
with European policies and decisions often are likely to be more
limited in terms of their resources concerning other regions of the
world. The quality of comparison is a function of the quality and
availability of information. In the case of the Paul Weiss Survey,
the authors compensated for the lack of printed information by
drawing on resources from around the world, including the staff of
their Hong Kong office.
Even if the statutes and decisions are available, formal lan
guage and legal terminology within statutory or regulatory material
are potentially misleading as the exclusive source of law.^^ Words
alone do not convey the manner in which concepts are variously
carried out and enforced. In some societies, a formal prohibition
may be quite strict, but the practice may be quite lenient. A similar
divergence may exist when interpreting constitutional principles.
US courts, for example, regard freedom of speech almost entirely
as a liberty against the state, while constitutional courts in Europe
treat similar language as incorporating a value which authorizes or
directs affirmative state action. It is a difficult task for the comparatist to know how such a deviation between language, practice,
and interpretation should be classified and conveyed. This prob
lem can likewise be translated into a concern for the availability of
data. A researcher must mediate between, on the one hand, the
necessities of concluding and communicating and, on the other, ex
ploring practices far more subtle and complex than the language of
law and regulation provides.^" The Paul Weiss Survey is careful to
A fairly extensive literature acknowledging the importance of language as a factor in
comparative research and law exists. See, e.g., BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH
AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 13 (1990).
20 Esin OrilcU lists legal history, sociology of law, anthropology of law, international
law, political science, and culture and development studies as playing a significant role in
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note that it was restricUng itself, to the degree possible, to the formal language of statutes.
Finally, meanings of the same word (even m the same formal
language) may vary from country to country. The thmg called a
"network" in one country may be referred to only as a channe
in another. Thus, it is not only the formal language of statutes that
can be problematic; the translation of different laws and regula
tions into a common language can also be a potential mmefield of
misunderstandings. One example involves the original German
text of the new 1996 Broadcasting State Treaty,
"
svertrag, which became effective at the beginning of 1997. Para
graph 28.5 states that stronger anti-concentration regulations have
been introduced for information-related "programmes.
"Programmes," here, means television services or channels. Since
no official translation had yet been developed, the authors of the
Paul Weiss Survey had to confirm the proper meanmg of the term
by consulting with the relevant authorities and expert lawyers m
the field.
B. The Speed of Change of Regulation and Law Within the
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sector
A second area where a caveat is important has to do with the
pace of change. Comparative research usually provides only a
snapshot of regulatory formations when a motion
quired. Even during the three months of completmg the Paul
Weiss Survey, there was the impending likelihood of mportant na
tional or regional decisions that could have impacted the final re
port, the tables, and the presentation to the Joint Parliamentary
Committee.
. • i.
While this is a problem of research generally, and certainly
research that depicts the way in which the world is organized as of
a certain date, it is particularly true in the area of telecommunica
tions and broadcasting. For example, at the moment much is still
being decided in the relations between the EU and its member
states In addition, there are complex arrangements among the
Union's own institutions (e.g., the rivalry
liament and the different directorates generals of the European
this process of understanding national and mixed LEGAL
TBMS; MIXED AND MIXING 335-52 (Esin OrilcU et al. eds., 1996).
21 Runfunkstaatsvertrag of 26 Aug. 1996.

^ LEGAL SYS-
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Commission). Law and regulation (e.g., on audiovisual policy^^ in
general, or on issues of cross-ownership^^ in particular) are still
fluid. Technology itself is changing, rendering old categories of
regulation confusing and superfluous. The entrance of cable and
satellite television, for instance, intensified the pressure or demand
for certain kinds of program content across national borders.^
Digital compression solves the problem of scarcity of transmission
possibilities (frequencies) and makes a large part of the traditional
justification for the regulation of broadcasting irrelevant. Conver
gence, a favorite doctrine of regulation analysts, suggests that ex
isting categories for regulation are being confounded.
Fundamental changes, which are forcing the community of na
tions to confront problems of telecommunications, also make law
far from static. The debate is not only whether regulation should
take place at the transnational level, but whether communications
are to be treated as culture or as trade. And while both ap
proaches will undoubtedly be accommodated as an outcome
22 Hie European Commission, for example, recently considered a memorandum of
Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, responsible for cultural and audiovisual policies, review
ing the situation and outlook for the audiovisual policy of the BU. He announced that he
planned to present a number of initiatives in the forthcoming months, including the estab
lishment of a high-level study group restricted to only a few members, which would have
the task of studying developments in the sector and making recommendations for the fu
ture of EU audiovisual policy. Commission of the European Communities, Outlook on the
European Union Audiovisual Policy, Press Release, IP/97/717, July 7, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rapid Rle.
23 Already since the late 1980s, concerns have been expressed within the Community
that competition policy fails to control media concentrations due to problems of market
definition and issues of pluralism. At the end of 1992, the European Commission pubfished a Green Paper which analyzed the issue of concentration in the media, discussed the
need for action and suggested possible courses of action. Pluralism and Media Concentra
tion in the Internal Market — An Assessment of the Need for Community Action: Com
mission Green Paper, COM(92)480 final. Option one was that no specific action should be
taken at Community level; option two proposed cooperative action to ensure greater trans
parency of media ownership and control; option three proposed to eliminate differences
(harmonization) between national restrictions on media ownership. The Green Paper
launched a wide consultation process which culminated in the 1994 follow-up Commission
Communication. Follow-up to the Consultation Process Relating to the Green Paper on
"Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market — An Assessment of the
Need for Community Action": Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament, COM(94)353 final. Since then. Commissioner Mario Monti
(DGXV) has indicated that he is in favor of harmonizing national media ownership rules.
However, an agreement on the proposal to be contained in a draft directive has still not
been reached at the level of the Commission.
24 See NEW MEDIA POLITICS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN WESTERN EUROPE (De
nis McQuail & Karen Siune eds., 1986).
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evolves, it is the very relationship between the two forces which is
vital for shaping doctrine. There are many examples of this rapid
ity of change in the field of telecommunications and broadcasting.
One highly technical, but important, example is whether DTH
providers who, as is the practice, provide signals for pay to sub
scribers rather than free to air are "broadcasters" within the defini
tion of section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 of the US.^^
If a DTH provider is a "broadcaster" within that narrow definition,
then foreign equity ownership restrictions apply.
At the time the Paul Weiss Survey was commenced, the staff
of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") had deter
mined that such a DTH provider was not a broadcaster and that
the term "broadcaster" in US legislative interpretation was re
served to those, like traditional terrestrial providers, who furnished
a free-to-air signal. At the same time, as the Survey notes, key
figures in the Clinton Administration, including the Trade Repre
sentative, had written a letter to the Chair of the FCC, suggesting
that this was an erroneous reading of the statute. The issue here is
the way in which the very concept of DTH is conceptualized and
how that conceptualization is harmonized within existing regula
tory approaches.
In Canada, as well, there were complicated pending develop
ments at the time the Survey was being completed concerning the
Government's attitude toward broadcast signals received domesti
cally from DTH providers using non-licensed orbital slots. The
Government issued a policy declaring it illegal for businesses to sell
decoding devices and other objects necessary for receiving these
foreign signals (usually from the US), and a court decision was
pending. While the Survey was being completed, a decision of an
intermediate court held that the government prosecutions were
lawful.2® It was not clear, nor would it be for months, what impact
this decision would have and whether it would lead to a different
form of negotiation between the US and Canada. This, too, is an
example of a change in law that is hard to characterize and hard to
reduce to tabular form.
EU legislation and its implementation is similarly complex and
dynamic. The "TV Without Frontiers" Directive is a single-market
25 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1988).
26 Express Vu, Inc. v. Nil Norsat Int'l, Inc., No. T-1639-96 (Fed. Ct. July 23, 1997),
appeal dismissed. No. A-541-97 (Fed. Ct. App. Nov. 20,1997).
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which governs transfrontier television broadcasting
within the European Community ("EC")-^^ However, for it to
work effectively it is essential that certain elements are imple
mented in a common manner by all member states. One such ele
ment is the determination of which country should have
jurisdiction over a broadcaster. From the EC perspective, the cru
cial factor is that each broadcaster should come under the jurisdic
tion of one — and only one — member state. In order to achieve
that goal, it is clearly essential that a single system of determining
jurisdiction be in operation throughout the Community.
This is where a problem has arisen. When member states
came to implement the Directive at the national level, differing in
terpretations of the provisions on jurisdiction developed. In imple
menting the Directive, the UK, for instance, chose to use the locus
of satellite uplink as the basis of jurisdiction. That was the criterion
used in the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier Tele
vision, which predated the Directive and was to some extent a
model for European broadcasting regulation.^® Other member
states, however, used the broadcaster's place of establishment.^®
The situation did not cause too many practical problems for
the UK because the vast majority of services uplinked from the UK
were by broadcasters also established in the UK. In 1992, how
ever, the European Commission initiated legal action against the
UK on the ground that, by using the country of uplink as the basis
of jurisdiction, the UK had misinterpreted the Directive. That pro
cess culminated in the judgment by the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") in September 1996, which recognized that "establish
ment" — having to do with the locus of the business — was the
correct basis for determining jurisdiction.®" Consequently, just as
the Paul Weiss Survey was being submitted, the House of Lords

instrument

27 Council Directive 89/552,1989 O.J. (L 298). See also Council Directive 97/36/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending Cotmcil Directive
89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad
ministrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting ac
tivities, 1997 O.J. (L 202).
28 European Convention on Transfrontier Television, May 5,1989, Europ. T.S. No. 132.
29 A broadcaster's place of establishment is generally held to be the place in which it
has its head office and where decisions about programming content are made. Uplink is
the technical process whereby programs are broadcast from a specific transmitter on earth
to a satellite, where they are subsequently downlinked back to satellite receptors on earth.
30 E.C. Comm'n v. U.K. (Re Television Broad. Directive), 3 C.M.L.R. 793 (E.C.J.
1996).
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adopted a new statutory order^^ to implement the court's decision,
changing the way satellite is regulated in the UK profoundly.
Moreover, during the development of the Paul Weiss Survey, the
"TV Without Frontiers" Directive was amended in ways that have
implications on the regulatory framework of the member states dis
cussed in the Survey.
C. Limitations Based on Selection, Comparability and
Simplification
The difficulties involved in comparative media law and policy
studies as a result of country selection have already been discussed.
The Survey sought to include countries that the Indian decision
makers considered relevant and important, especially democratic
models that had some of the same concerns about values and pub
lic service broadcasting. Further, the Survey, if it were to be an
effective commentary on restrictions, such as those on foreign eq
uity holders and national uplinking, had to be sufficiently broad
that a variety of models and examples would be included. On the
other hand, because of limitations such as the availability of relia
ble information, some countries that might otherwise have been
included in the study had to be excluded.
In general, the comparability of regulatory regimes depends
on a number of factors, some constant, many transient. Some commentators^^ list the following determinative factors: the cultural,
political, and economic components of a society, the particular re
lationships that exist between the state and its citizens, a society's
value system and its particular conception of the individual. Other
general factors include the homogeneity of the society in question
and its geographical situation, language, and religion. It was clear
from the beginning of the Paul Weiss Survey that no other place in
the world has India's unique history, diversity, and special cultural
needs. Few places, for instance, have had to work out in so coniplex a fashion the complementary role between the country's
center and its regions in formulating broadcasting and cultural pol
icy. There are also few places becoming so fully integrated into the
world political and economic discourse. Taken as a group, these
form a set of characteristics unique to India that made comparison
31 Satellite Television Service Regulations, 1997.
32 See, e.g., PETER DE CRUZ, A MODERN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1993).
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difficult. It is difficult to find countries that have achieved a similar
stage of development given India's various levels of diversity.
The problem of simplification and definition is perhaps even
more difficult than the problem of selection. Almost all forms of
comparison require the articulation of similarities so that resem
blance and differences can be noted. The structure of the Indian
Broadcasting Bill featured definitional forms sufficiently new and
distinctive that comparison required redefining aspects of other
systems.^^ The best example of this is the definition in the Indian
Broadcasting Bill of "satellite television broadcasting service" as "a
satellite broadcasting service for providing video progranunes,"
where a "satellite broadcasting service" as defined by section 2{ze)
means "a service provided by using a satellite and received with or
without the help of a local delivery system but does not include
Direct-to-Home service."
Here, India was defining the channel, not the carrier, in a way
that had little similarity elsewhere, especially in Europe and the
33 There is, however, a world-wide confusion on how to define satellite broadcasting in
general. The International Television Union ("ITU"), for instance, distinguishes broad
casting satellite services ("BSS") from fixed satellite services ("FSS"), which have different
regulatory implications especially at the level of coordination and registration. BSS are
intended for direct reception by the general public, which includes both individual and
community reception. This aspect of the ITU rules establishes that BSS transmissions are
delivered either to individual consumers with a small dish at their home or to cable,
MMDS, or SMATV headends for retransmission to consumers via cable. FSS services are
provided between specified fixed points, typically involving telecommunications services.
When the distinction between BSS and FSS was made, it was not feasible for consumers to
receive FSS transmissions without very large antennas. Since then, however, satellite tech
nology has improved, and a substantial number of both C- and Ku-band FSS receivers are
now used to deliver entertainment programming directly to viewers. The use of FSS fre
quencies for "BSS-like" services is often referred to as DTH service.
At a national level, some regulators in Canada, for instance, refer to the industry gen
erally as DTH. The FCC chose years ago to use the term "direct broadcast service"
("DBS") when discussing both domestic policy matters and BSS with regard to ITU spec
trum allocation matters. In its latest report on the video market, the FCC included both
BSS and Ku-band FSS services as DBS. Other regulators in Europe avoid these terms and
simply refer to both FSS and BSS as "satellite broadcasting." Within the satellite industry,
most refer to direct broadcasting services using the BSS as DBS, and those using the FSS
as DTH. However, as the WTO telecoms talks and other high-level meetings have proven,
this confusioniis of high significance for operators since depending on how they use these
frequencies, it could FSS as DTH. However, as the WTO telecoms talks and other highlevel meetings have proven, this confusion is highly significant for operators since depend
ing on how they use these frequencies, it could shape their future regulatory burdens and
responsibilities. For an interesting discussion of this confusion, see G.E. Oberst, Defining
Satellite Broadcasting, VIA SATELLITE, May 1, 1997, available in WESTLAW, lac-Promt
File.
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US. In the US, the relevance of "channel" for regulatory purposes
had applied to terrestrial services and was recognized and defined
for must-carry purposes on cable television. In Europe and else
where, it was the satellite providers which were regulated and the
subject of obligations. But the idea of licensing specific channels
for non-terrestrial services was largely an innovation in the Indian
Bill. This made comparison either too easy or too difficult. Com
parison was simplified because a similar form of regulation, with
the channel as the defining element, was rare; it was difficult be
cause a conclusion that no similarities existed might not tell the
whole story. While Canada, for instance, did not license channels,
a process existed in some countries for approving which satellitedelivered channels could be carried, at least on cable television
systems.
Cross-media ownership comparisons provided a similar prob
lem. The Indian Broadcasting Bill seemed highly unusual in terms
of its prohibitions against ownership of DTH systems and other
media. But it was unclear whether this absence of law elsewhere
was because of an intrinsic difference between new media and old
(in terms of cross-ownership policy) or because governments had
not yet addressed the issue.
The need to clarify was the aesthetically appealing side of the
need to simplify. Clarifying made it necessary to determine what
was actually auctioned in countries like the US (where auctions
take place) and what was being proposed for auction in India. The
need to simplify helped find the difference between licensing and
auctioning spectrum, on the one hand, and licensing or auctioning
the right to use spectrum for a delivery platform, on the other. The
same need to clarify appeared when considering the licensing re
gime of satellite services within the EU. As explained above, con
fusion existed in determining which criterion (uplinking or
establishment) should be used to consider which jurisdiction ap
plies. Interestingly, when a service was not established in a Euro
pean member state (e.g., Doordarshan), it did not need a hcense at
all within the EU.
V.

CONTEXT

Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution that is said
to be superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether the so
lution has proved satisfactory in its country of origin, and second,
whether it will work in the country which has proposed to adopt it.
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It may well prove impossible to adopt a solution tried and tested
abroad, without modification, because of differences in court pro
cedures, the powers of the various authorities, the working of the
economy, or the general social context into which it would have to
fit.
A problem to be addressed in any comparative study is, there
fore, one of context. In terms of media law and policy, for exam
ple, it is important to understand the reasons that a comparison is
being made, reasons that may not have to do with the law itself, but
with the objectives of law. Often the goal of a broadcast regulatory
structure is to increase the diversity of voices or to enhance the
right of a citizen to receive or impart information. A restriction on
foreign ownership may have a totally different impact in a society
rich in broadcast signals from one where such signals are few and
competition is just beginning. For example, a society like Canada,
in which there is a broad array of signals coming from outside its
borders, may have a different basis for regulation from a society in
which few or no such signals exist. The law proposed may be the
same, but its impact on citizens would be far less restrictive in Can
ada than in a less signal-rich society. There are differences be
tween societies, like the US, where restrictions are few, but signals
from outside the country are rare, especially relative to other West
ern countries. Rules do not often reveal these differences in con
text, even though contextual differences may justify their very
uniqueness. Context can reveal whether a society's rules are sup
ported by unusual problems of language diversity, national secur
ity, or adjustment to democratic values. All of these problems are
the bases for departures from what might be deemed an interna
tional (or Western) norm. A rule does not disclose on its face
whether it exists primarily to protect national values and aspira
tions or to protect entrenched competitors.
Another way to look at the problems of context is to examine
issues presented by country-by-country analyses. In its discussion
of Australia, for example, the Paul Weiss Survey accurately reports
that, while the Australian Broadcasting Authority ("ABA") "gen
erally does not auction subscription broadcasting services
licenses[,]" "[ajuctions are sometimes used for commercial broad
casting services (i.e., services that are not DTH or cable television
subscription services)."^'* This statement, accurate as a summary.
PAUL, WEISS, supra note 7, at 39.
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cannot, of course, convey Australia's troubled history of regulation,
re-regulation, bankruptcy and reorganization.^^ This history af
flicted the development of DTH as a competitor for terrestrial tele
vision and as a mechanism to provide better competitive service to
wide reaches of the country. Auctions were held for satellite televi
sion services, but this meant that ill-prepared licensees, willing to
make unrealistic bids, constrained the DTH monopoly position and
could not perform the social tasks assigned to them.
Germany provides another example. Like most other Euro
pean countries, Germany is in the process of relaxing its media
ownership regulations. The outcome of ongoing negotiations on
the issue of media ownership between the two major political par
ties (CDU and SPD) has been incorporated into the updated ver
sion of the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag. As the Paul Weiss Survey notes,
the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag stipulates that "an illegal level of media
concentration is reached if a single satellite television holding com
pany (not a single broadcasting service) captures more than a thirty
percent share of the total annual viewership."^^ The context of this
statement is important. The previous regulations demanded that
no company should control more than one general channel and
one specialized channel.^' Moreover, the current level of thirty
percent is set so high that it is not reached by any broadcaster,
including the two major conglomerates, Kirsch and Bertelsmann.
The loosening of the regulations has also led to a merger of the
broadcasting activities of BertelsmannAJfa and CLT/RTL into one
single company, Ufa/RTL, it now being the most extensive televi
sion actor in Europe.
Describing and analyzing Italian media policy has always been
problematic because of its chaotic development, mainly due to
political changes. The Paul Weiss Survey describes the situation as
it was at the moment of submission, but volatility is hard to com
municate. The economy, politics, and media have always been
closely linked in Italy. The disappearance of the old political estab
lishment from 1992 to 1994 has sent shock waves through the mass
media system. The transition governments of those years and the
Berlusconi Cabinet succeeded, to some extent, in ending the domi35 See generally JENNIFER CRAIK ET AL., PUBUC VOICES, PRIVATE INTERESTS: AUS
TRALIA'S MEDIA POLICY (1995).
3® PAUL, WEISS, supra note 7, at 19.
37 For a discussion of the German media policy, see PETER HUMPHREYS, MEDIA AND
MEDIA POLICY IN GERMANY (1994).
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nation of the former parties over the RAI (the public service
broadcaster) governing bodies and channels. But, at the same
time, the Berlusconi monopoly of commercial television channels
came under fire from opposition forces, which also strongly pushed
toward a reform of Italy's Broadcasting Act.^®
Parliament, at the end of 1995, after more than one year of
heated discussion, had not succeeded in finding a viable agreement
on new legislation on antitrust nor on the entire radio-television
system. The three referenda promoted in the spring of 1995 to by
pass the Parliamentary stalemate and to introduce some severe
anti-concentration measures missed the target, as the majority of
citizens voted against the proposed prohibition to own more than
one television channel (first referendum), against the ban on com
mercial breaks (second referendum), and in favor of a partial
privatization of RAI (third referendum). Finally, as the Paul Weiss
Survey observes, the new Prodi Cabinet presented a legislation
proposal which, if approved, is likely to introduce profound
changes in Italy's media domain.
During the preparation of the Paul Weiss Survey, the Euro
pean Parliament and the Council of Ministers finally adopted the
new text of the "Television Without Frontiers" Directive, the main
objective of which is to create the conditions necessary for the free
movement of television broadcasts. Directive 97/36/EC, which
modifies Directive 89/552/EEC, the "Television Without Frontiers"
Directive, is the result of two years of intensive negotiations be
tween the EC institutions. Awareness of the context and com
promises made during the review permits a better understanding of
the new rules. One major issue of dispute was the quota principle.
Article 4 of the 1989 Directive stated that member states must en
sure that broadcasters reserve the majority of transmission time for
European works; the fear was that American programs would
otherwise swamp the European market. The types of programs ex
cluded from the quotas (news, sports, events, games, advertising,
and teletext services) indicated that the concern was for the Euro
pean film industry. Article 5 dealt with quotas for independent
works (ten percent), which aimed to safeguard the smaller in
dependent sector. The quota principle was highly controversial

3® See Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Towards a Videocracy? Italian Political Communication
at a Turning Point, 10 EUR. J. COMM. 291 (1995).
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and was a major dispute at several meetings on the General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
During the review of the 1989 Directive, some member states,
such as France, supported by the European Parliament, suggested
that the quota levels be raised and made more certain. It was gen
erally considered a victory for American program producers when
the European Parliament finally voted in November not to tighten
the EU's broadcast restrictions on foreign products. The Parlia
ment narrowly approved a measure allowing each of the fifteen
EU countries to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis to the
remaining fifty-one percent of EU-produced content on broadcast,
cable, and satellite television channels, which can be considered a
further watering down of the restrictions. The Parliament decided
that instead of greater restrictions, newer methods such as incen
tives should meet the same objective.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not only wise, but inevitable, that policy makers aiming at
broadcast reform will seek to learn from practices in other systems.
The goal of this chapter was to examine the challenges presented in
engaging in the process of comparative analysis. We have used the
Paul Weiss Survey, designed to aid the legislative review in India,
as an example of the complexities of change. We have also tried to
address the difficulties imposed by language, technological change,
and context. The Study indicates both the strengths and limitations
of an exercise in comparative media analysis.

